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Over the last twenty-five years formal political theorists have discussed at 
great length and with theoretical intensity the problem of chaos or equilibrium 
in the political economy. This essay argues that there are four distinct research 
programs in rational choice theory, characterized by distinctions between 
individual and collective choice, and between preferences and beliefs.
The essay reviews the possibility of chaos rather than equilibrium in the 
four programs. As an application fundamental theoretical differences are 
delineated in various political economies, namely the U.S., Britain and in the 
multiparty systems based on proportional representation in Europe. Using 
these models a critique is provided of a class of arguments which assert that 
political choice can give rise to economically irrational policies. Finally some 
comments are addressed to the question of the maintenance of political 
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An extremely powerful notion to use in attempting to understand human 
society is that of the market, conceived in the broadest sense. Each individual 
is endowed with intellectual, physical and moral resources and uses these in a 
rational way to attain personal goals. Implicit in this conception is the ancillary 
notion of free trade: that each individual has the ability and opportunity to 
trade with others who are so inclined. In economic versions of the market a 
price vector may determine the content of permissible trades. Under certain 
conditions (basically to do with the extent to which individual desires are pri­
vate) the “equilibrium”, x, of the market is Paretian: that is there exists no 
other state y which is preferred by everyone to x.
However it is implausible that all human desires are private-regarding: we 
all need compansionship, security, love, interaction, etc. It is not at all clear 
that such aspects of our lives, often called public goods, can be attained in 
some reasonable fashion by a market. It is possible, however, that some of 
these goods can be created in the context of a political market. The fundamen­
tal question, then, for political economy is whether the political “market” can 
create public goods such as order and security in a Paretian fashion. This con­
cern with equilibrium and Pareto optimality has lead to a lively theoretical 
debate over the last thirty years. Indeed this debate has spilled back into eco­
nomic theory, since it is now realized that economic markets can be disordered 
or chaotic. There has also been a (mostly empirical) debate over the degree to 
which activity in the political market place can contaminate the equilibrium or 
Paretian features of the economic market.
I propose in this essay to present my own views on these debates, to ascer­
tain how they may illuminate the notion of political order. My view is that the 
theoretical framework that underlies both the economic and political market is 
that of rational choice theory (RCT), and it is necessary to start with a reason­





















































































































































































Four Research Programs in Rational Choice Theory
Diagram 1 distinguishes between preferences and beliefs on the one hand 
and individual and collective choice on the other. To deal first with the con­
trast between preference and belief, it is evident that in modelling individual 
choice, say, it is important to deal not only with the individual's preferences, 
or desires; it is also necessary to understand how that individual conceives of 
the world, and its behavior. Just to get at the difference, does a juror who as­
serts a defendant is innocent do so because of a preference for innocence, or 
because of a belief in innocence? A belief may be changed as new evidence 
comes to light, but a preference may stay unchanged.









The contrast between individual and collective conceptions is to some extent 
a matter of degree, but “individual” models focus on the rational decision 
making of a single entity examining all possibilities or eventualities. On the 
collective side, although the collectivity is made up of rational individuals, 
there is in general no attempt to fully model all the possible choices made by 
each individual. These distinctions may become clearer below. For the mo­
ment it is worth emphasizing that the earliest work in RCT was by the Marquis 
de Condorcet (1745-1794) who studied both belief and preference (collective) 
choice.
In my view collective choice is conceptually akin to field theory in physics 
(namely gravitation, originating in the work of Newton (1842-1727), and elec­
tromagnetism, integrated by Maxwell in 1864). The individual choice theories 
are 20th Century inventions and are conceptually close to the quantum theories 
of the weak and strong nuclear force. There is a further connection concern­
ing computability; full analysis of quantised systems involving three or more 
entities can be astonishingly complex. In the same way, game theoretic analysis 
of individual choice involving two agents is often possible, but when there are 
three or more individuals and no symmetry it is often impossible to fully elab­
orate the likely behavior. For this reason it is often necessary to use collective 
choice theory as an approximation, because of the intractibility of working at 




























































































there are many interacting bodies. In rational choice theory the move from the 
individual level to the collective level is somedmes more a matter of faith than 
of proof.
There is one other connecdon between the physical science research pro- p  
grams and the radonal choice programs, or more particulary between the pro­
gram based on gravitadon/mechanics and the collective preference program. m  
Although the “Newtonian” inverse square law of gravitadon provided the the­
oretical basis for the development of mechanics, there was deep concern over 
the computability of the model of the solar system. The problem was this: 
although the dynamical system involving one planet and one sun could be 
written down explicitly, it was unclear whether a model involving two planets 
and a sun was computationally stable. More particularly, small perturbation 
effects of planet A on planet B might imply that the orbit solution for B was 
non-convergent. Empirically this could mean that calculations for B would, 
over time, become inaccurate. If the perturbation errors remain small, then 
the system of planetary equations is called structurally stable. Laplace, in his 
work on celestial mechanics (1799-1825) conjectured that the system was 
indeed structurally stable. An attempt at a proof by Henri Poincaré (1854- 
1912) in 1890 suggested that a planetary system could be highly unstable. (In 
fact, recent analysis using high speed computers suggests that the solar system 
is basically structurally stable.) However Poincare's work laid the foundations 
for the qualitative study of dynamical systems, and for one of the fundamental 
theorems of mathematics of the twentieth century. If the underlying space of 
the dynamical system has no more than two dimensions, then almost all such 
systems are structurally stable (Peixoto, 1962). However, if there are at least 
three dimensions, then there is a rich class of chaotic systems (Smale, 1966). A 
chaotic system is one that exhibits an extreme form of dependency on initial 
conditions or parameters. Although it might be possible to examine a chaotic 
system in qualitative terms, it is almost impossible to predict exactly how the 
system will behave. To come back to celestial mechanics, it is known that 
chaotic planetary systems consisting of three bodies are a theoretical possibility 
(Saari, 1970, 1976). It is also possible that some small but important compo­
nents of the solar system (such as asteroids, comets and minor moons) have 
chaotic behavior. Smale's result suggests that there are dynamical systems 
described by completely deterministic equations that are fundamentally chaotic 
and thus, to all intents and purposes, unpredictable.
One of the main topics for debate in rational choice theory has concerned the 
possibility for chaos within collective choice mechanisms. Although the debate 
has cooled off recently, I still view it as of fundamental importance for any 




























































































The Arrow “Collective Preference” Program
Arrow's (1951) Impossibility Theorem is the fundamental result in the the­
ory of collective choice: No aggregation procedure which combines “rational” 
individual preferences (transitive in both strict preference and indifference) 
can result in a “rational” social preference ordering respecting both the Pareto 
criterion (unanimity) and non-dictatorship. Since voting is one of the funda­
mental collective choice procedures, we can interpret Arrow's result through 
its implications for (deterministic) voting. In this context the requirement that 
the procedure give a “rational” ranking is obviously unnecessarily strong. All 
that we really need is that the procedure give a “choice”, and this can be guar­
anteed if the ranking is required to be acyclic (that is lacking in cycles of the 
form: x  preferred to preferred to z preferred to x).
An important situation is where the set of alternatives has a geometric form 
(given by a particular dimension). In this case the “choice” or collective equi­
librium of the procedure is usually called the core. It was shown by Black 
(1958) and Downs (1957) that if this “policy space” of alternatives was one­
dimensional, then a core could be guaranteed if preferences were 'convex'. 
More recently, it has been demonstrated that a non-veto voting process 
(labelled D} has a number v(D) (called the Nakamura (1979) number or sta­
bility dimension of (D), which partially classifies the process in the following 
way. If the dimension is no greater than v(D), then a core must always exist 
(Schofield 1984). However, if the dimension is (v(D) + 1) then a core need not 
occur. Instead, voting cycles are possible. However, these cycles must belong 
to the Pareto set, and in general, the phenomenon of cycling will be con­
strained. Disorder, even if it occurs, can still be compatible with a reasonable 
ordering of collective choice. However, this insight, which was first due to 
Tullock (1967), is invalid in higher dimensions. In particular, for each pro­
cess, D, there is a second classifying integer, w(D), with the following prop­
erty. If the dimension is at least w(D) then a core almost never exists. Thus 
cycles are generic, in the sense that, for almost all preference configurations, 
cycles must occur. Even more seriously, if the dimension is at least (w(D) + 
1), the “chaos dimension”, then it is generically the case that these cycles fill 
the space. In other words, from any one point in the “policy space” it is possi­
ble to construct a political agenda which will lead to any other point (Schofield 
1985; McKelvey and Schofield 1986).
These results are essentially based on a particular condition due to Fan 
(1961) applied to a correspondence F that describes the voting process, D. 
That is for any point x, let F(x) be the set of points that beat x  under the rules 
D of the procedure. The Fan condition is that at every x, F(x) lies in a “half 
space”. If the dimension is less than v(D), then the “Fan” condition must be 
satisfied, no “cycles” can occur and a core must exist. We can infer that chaos 
is impossible. On the other hand, if the dimension exceeds w(D) then, generi­




























































































every point x  in S. This implies the 5-reachability condition: that every point x 
of 5 is reachable from any point in 5. Notice that this does not quite imply the 
existence of chaos. However it does imply that there exists a selection /  (a 
function) from F such that the process [x, f(x),....f k(x),...} is chaotic (Saari, 
1985).
The two differing situations, with and without equilibrium, can be charac­
terized in a geometric way which is intuitively satisfying. In the equilibrium 
case, below the stability dimension, there is at every point a social welfare 
gradient which determines the permissible or socially feasible moves. 
“Rational” moves or transitions made by the society will then lead into the 
equilibrium. This gradient represents in some abstract sense the local consen­
sus that the society can attain. It is precisely at the instability dimension w(D) 
that there can occur points where no consensus (or social welfare gradient) is 
possible, while at the chaos dimension consensus is almost always impossible. 
(These results concern deterministic voting, where it is assumed that any indi­
vidual is always in a position to rank alternatives. “Probabilistic” voting has 
different features and is discussed below.)
These abstract voting theorems have engendered considerable controversy 
on the viability of democratic institutions (Riker, 1982, 1986) and on the ex­
tent to which such institutions are in fact stable (Tullock, 1981). A recent lit­
erature has focussed on the evident fact that real political institutions have a 
great deal more structure than is assumed in these theorems (Shepsle 1979, 
Shepsle and Weingast 1981). Indeed it is obvious that with restrictions on 
coalition power and the existence of multiple veto groups there can exist equi­
librium. The question remains however: if it is no more than certain specified 
rules that keeps the equilibrium-inducing institutional structure in place, then 
what happens when the rules are broken? As I write this in 1994 it is evident 
that the enormously complex and rule-bound institutional structure of the 
Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe is being transformed. In both the 
political and economic realm there is strong evidence that chaos in the techni­
cal sense is occurring. While new institutional structures will doubtless appear, 
I for one would not hazard a guess as to their form.
The “chaos” voting theorems (McKelvey and Schofield, 1986) should per­
haps be viewed as a possibility result: that is for any type of non-dictatorial or 
democratic voting system it is possible, given high enough dimensionality, for 
complete 'disorder' to occur. “Neo-institutionalism” on the contrary empha­
sizes the fact that political choice is constrained by particular decision-making 
structures, by transaction costs, by lack of information, by norms and conven­
tions, etc. (See North, 1990 for an extensive discussion.) Recent work on 
modelling “representative” or parliamentary political systems generally con­
cludes that an “equilibrium” can be plausibly maintained when the representa­




























































































beliefs about the motivations of the electorate, of other representatives, and of 
the rules of interaction and of political discourse.
The chaos voting theorems are only directly relevant for models of commit­
tee choice in situations where the policy dimension is sufficiently high. Below 
the instability dimension, the models do suggest that majority rule committees 
(choosing in a two dimensional space) will make choices that are Paretian, and 
generally centrally located. Indeed if there are many voters (as in an elec­
torate), then the collective choice can be expected to belong to a very small 
area in the Pareto set (Schofield and Tovey, 1992). To go beyond these mod­
els, to make inferences about representative democracy on the basis of collec­
tive choice procedures is unwarranted without a fully developed model of the 
decision calculus of political agents, namely candidates, parties, representa­
tives, etc. Most of this work lies within the Nash program, and will be dis­
cussed below.
The Nash and Aumann “Individual” Programs
(Nash 1951; Aumann 1976). As we noted earlier, the existence of the com­
petitive equilibrium in an economic market is of fundamental importance. In 
this model, each individual acts out of rational self-interest to maximise utility 
on a budget set or production set, taking prices as exogenously given. More­
over, under certain private regarding conditions, there will exist a price vec­
tor such that all markets clear. Now in some sense such a model does not fully 
detail rational behavior. If individuals have reason to believe that their choice 
will affect prices, then they should build such reasoning into their choice. 
There are formal results (some of which are discussed elsewhere, Schofield 
1994a) that imply that manipulation of various kinds is a possibility for a 
“rich” class of economies.
However manipulation necessarily involves forming beliefs about the way 
the world and people behave. So before pursuing the notion of manipulation 
further, it is useful to discuss results in the Aumann program of individual 
belief aggregation.
To give a simple case, consider a committee of experts each of whom has 
some private information, and thus a set of priors about the state of the world. 
If the experts have commonly understood models of the world, and their 
deliberation results in a “statistic” that encapsulates their information, then 
each can update their prior probability to form a posteriori probability distri­
butions. Eventually their posterior probabilities will converge (McKelvey and 
Page, 1986). However this convergence depends on certain “common knowl­




























































































In a more complex situations such as the market, individuals not only have 
private information, but quite distinct preferences. Thus to model an individ­
ual's rational calculation, we may have to model that individual's beliefs about 
other agents' beliefs, and model their beliefs about others, etc., etc. As Arrow 
(1986) has noted, an understanding of markets may require a solution to this 
underlying “common knowledge” problem. One recent technical result by 
Nyarko (1993) suggests that general models of markets, involving both beliefs 
and preferences, tend to bifurcate into two classes. For certain “equilibrium” 
markets, the underlying fundamentals of the game imply that reiteration 
results in a contraction to beliefs and behavior which are mutually consistent. 
For other markets, given any possible behavioral trajectory there is some 
system of initial “hierarchichaJ” beliefs which can trigger the trajectory.
Thus while there may well exist a “Nash” equilibrium in a relatively simple 
market game, a more structured game form, where individual rational behav­
ior is modelled more fully, can be chaotic. (Indeed Brock et al. 1991, have 
found empirical evidence of chaos in stock markets.) The transition from 
equilibrium to chaos can also be seen in public goods or “prisoners dilemma” 
(PD) situations. The standard view of the one shot prisoner's dilemma is that 
each individual should rationally defect. Consequently the Pareto preferred 
cooperative outcome will not occur. The “irrationality” of this Hobbesian non- 
cooperative outcome is usually viewed as a basis for the necessity of govern­
ment for public goods provision (Taylor 1976). Many authors have argued 
that cooperation can be maintained if the PD is reiterated in time (Taylor 
1982; Hardin 1982; Axelrod, 1984). The seminal work by Kreps, Milgrom, 
Roberts and Wilson (1982) indicated however that, as the iterated game nears 
its end, then complicated behavior can be sustained by quite reasonable beliefs 
about others' behavior. Since rational behavior by each individual in the PD is 
thus based on common knowledge foundations, it is in principle possible for 
“anything to happen”. This is the basis for the so-called folk theorem 
(Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). To relate this back to the ideas of chaos, 
Richards (1990) has shown that “empirical chaos” can occur in two person 
prisoner's dilemmas. Other instances of chaos at the theoretical level include 
models of bandwagon effects, fashions and fads (Bikhchandani, et al., 1992) 
and the bifurcation into equilibrium or chaos shown in n-person collective 
active games by Huberman and Glance (1994).
The point of this observation is not to just assert that chaos is possible, but to 
emphasize that any theoretical model which attempts to demonstrate that some 
phenomenon is likely in a particular collective context is probably wrong.
This caveat should be kept in mind when considering the various models that 
have been proposed to describe political competition. Deterministic models of 
two-candidate or two-party competition have had to deal with the chaos results 
mentioned earlier. The various models vary somewhat with regard to the as­




























































































assume that the fundamental motivation is to win. Since there can in general be 
no certainty of winning (and indeed no equilibrium) it has been proposed that 
the candidates converge towards a set known as the uncovered set (McKelvey, 
1986). The logic of this is that the candidates use mixed strategies, randomiz­
ing among a set of possible policy objectives. However it is difficult to regard 
this as a serious model of candidate objectives. Perhaps a more plausible situa­
tion to model is one where candidates owe obligations to particular interest 
groups, and so have “induced policy preferences”. Rational candidates might 
then choose policy points near the center of the electoral distribution. I have 
tentatively proposed an equilibrium notion called the “heart” (Schofield 1993a) 
which is defined, and continuous, in the voter preferences which can be 
thought of as an “attractor” for candidates. However, “policy driven” models 
of this kind do not generally exhibit the degree of candidate convergence 
found in one-dimensional Downsian “policy-blind” models of political com­
petition.
Coherent models with more than two parties are even more difficult to con­
struct. The earlier literature (ably summarized in Shepsle, 1991) assumed par­
ties attempted to maxmimize the number of seats or votes they won in the 
election. Such an assumption is open to criticism and it is more plausible to 
assume that parties are committed to certain policy positions, but perhaps 
modify these positions before the election both with regard to electoral returns 
and the constraints these declared objectives will have on negotiation over 
government. It is evident that such models have to address the degree of cred­
ible commitment that the parties have towards their declared policies. For 
example in Britain the Labour Party has clearly attempted, over the last four 
years, to move towards the “political center”, yet under Kinnock and Smith the 
electorate found the various declarations less than credible. Perhaps with Blair 
as the new leader of the party, it will be possible for Labour to take over the 
middle ground. It is obvious that the electoral response involves beliefs as well 
as perferences. However details of the electoral system can be very important 
in turning beliefs into votes and seats. A later section will return to this theme.
The Condorcet “Collective BelieF’ Program
Condorcet's (1785) idea was that politics can be thought of as the aggrega­
tion of the beliefs of the many concerning the truth. The simplest situation is 
one where each individual k, has some probability, pk of making the “correct” 
choice in binary decision. It is usually assumed that each pk > 0.5 and that the 
voter choices are independent. In this case the probability p  that a majority 
chooses the correct option exceeds 0.5 and indeed if the size of the society 
approaches infinity then p approaches 1. (Ladha, 1992)
We can use this model to approximate political competition between two 




























































































candidates compete for votes. Suppose further that the two candidates pick 
positions, x, y, and for convenience call the candidates x, y. For each voter, k, 
let (xk, yk) be the “distances” xk and yk from voter it’s position. Let pk be the 
probability that it votes for x. Suppose that the probability pk is chosen so that 
pk = 1/2 if xk = yk, while pk approaches 1 if yk approaches [<]. For each 
(x,y) let p(x,y) be the average of pk. In general if the pk's are independent, 
and if p(x,y) > 1/2 then the probability p(x,y) that x wins exceeds p(x,y). 
Moreover if the size of the society approaches infinity, then p(x,y) approaches 
1. In this model of collective belief aggregation no mention has been made 
about “preferences”. We have only modelled the nature of beliefs in terms of 
some underlying parameter space. The model has the feature under further 
“concavity” assumptions on the pk's that if the candidates desire to win, then 
they will choose identical positions (x = y). Moreover these positions are, in 
some sense, optimal in that they minimize the average distance R xk between 
the “winning” position and the voters. That is to say, the equilibrium position, 
x, is at the “barycenter” of the voter positions (Ladha and Schofield, 1994). 
Many probabilistic voting models (Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Coughlin, 1994) 
have similar features. My view is that these “probabilistic” models should be 
regarded as belief aggregation procedures rather than preference aggregation 
mechanisms. As we have noted above with regard to preference aggregation, 
if voters choose “deterministically” which candidate they prefer, then chaos 
can occur. It is still a lively debate in rational choice theory whether the equi­
librium results of belief aggregation models or the political chaos of determin­
istic, preference aggregation are more appropriate for interpreting political 
competition. My view is that political aggregation involves both preference 
and belief and that we are not yet in a position to fully model political behav­
ior. However we can perhaps draw some broad inferences depending on the 
general structure of the political institutions. The reader will have noticed that 
the previous discussion has been void of any mention of real political institu­
tions. What I propose to do now is sketch out the differences between Ameri­
can and British political institutions on the one hand, and the European politi­
cal systems based on proportional representation. I shall attempt to use the 






























































































Any elementary description of the U.S. distinguishes between the legislature, 
executive and judiciary. The fact that these three institutions are so distinct is 
the uniquely characteristic feature of the U.S. To formally describe the rela­
tionship between the institutions is overwhelmingly complex, but I shall, 
nonetheless present my own views on this. I assume that both the House and 
Senate are characterized by weak parties; that representatives and senators 
reflect heterogeneous, local preferences. Analyses of voting behavior in both 
houses (Poole and Rosenthal 1991) indicates tha* there is an underlying two- 
dimensionality in voting behavior in the Congress. I infer that there is a strong 
geographical structure to this heterogeneity. Intuitively I would say one 
dimension is an East-West cleavage, and we can think of it as old industry- 
new industry. A second dimension can be thought of as north-south, possibly 
pro- and anti-government intervention. The formal results by Schofield and 
Tovey (1992) mentioned earlier, given this heterogeneity, imply that the 
“heart” for both houses is small and centrally located. Small changes in elec­
tion results may cause this “heart” to move, but only “continuously”. Log­
rolling or vote exchanges in both houses are likely to lead to legislation in this 
heart. Compromise between the houses results in outcomes in the intersection 
of House and Senate hearts.
I conjecture that the same underlying “policy” space describes the system of 
electoral preferences in the population at large. However, presidential candi­
dates for the two parties are generally committed, through the operation of a 
system of primaries, to distinct policy positions. Because there is a significant 
degree of uncertainty in the outcomes of presidential elections, a probabilistic 
policy-driven model of two-candidate competition is plausible. As we empha­
sized such a model does not display convergence. Instead each candidate 
chooses a declaration that optimizes with regard to the policy commitment 
necessary to obtain endorsement, and with respect to the candiates' informa­
tion or belief over the probability of election. There is no reason to believe the 
equilibirum position of the winner belongs to the House-Senate heart. After 
the election it is plausible that the President then has to face the incompatibility 
between his underlying commitment on certain issues, his electoral promises as 
well as the difference between these and reasonable compromises (in the heart) 
with the House and Senate.
My view of the role of the judiciary requires that we introduce the notion of 
social or political risk. It is plausible that well structured political institutions 
should be designed to deal with risk in different ways. I infer that in general a 
president is risk averse, that the House and Senate are risk-neutral (because of 




























































































ference would require a book by itself. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that these 
underlying risk postures are sustained by beliefs and negotation both within 
and between these three institutions.
Britain
Unlike the U.S., Britain has a parliamentary system with a number of strong 
parties. The electoral system is first past the post (FPP), which implies there is 
a relatively low correlation between the proportions of votes cast for each of 
the parties and the proportion of seats they receive (Schofield, 1994b; 
Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). Small, but geographically concentrated parties, 
such as the Scottish or Welsh Nationalists tend to do quite well, proportionally.
The two current center parties, liberals and social democrats, even though 
they recently coalesced, gained very few seats given their electoral vote (less 
than 5% compared to 20%). There is a strong north-south feature to electoral 
politics, with the Conservative strength concentrated in the south and Labour 
strength in the north. Given what appears to be a fundamental uni-dimen­
sionality, there is little evidence of “Downsian” convergence to a voter 
median. To compare with the Downsian model, suppose that there were only 
two parties and a single dimension in Britain. Clearly policy commitment by 
either party would make it vulnerable to defeat by the other, and a strong 
centralizing tendency could be expected. This tendency with Blair and Major 
as the respective leaders (recently called Blajorism) is still quite weak. Assum­
ing that the parties are expected seat maximisers, subject to their ideological 
constraints, suggests that there is both a high degree of uncertainty imparted 
by the electoral system and more than one dimension to the political conflict. 
(It is possible that disagreements over European integration comprise a second 
independent dimension from the usual economic dimension.) It may be the 
case that a Condorcet model of probabilistic voting is the appropriate one to 
use. Even so, the subtlety of the electoral system means that no simple asser­
tion regarding the optimality of the winning party position can be made. Note 
also the difficulty with the Duverger hypothesis that only two parties can sur­
vive in an FPP system. Although the center parties are relatively impotent in 
parliamentary terms, they still obtain significant electoral support.
European Multiparty Systems
With an electoral system based on proportional representation (PR), politi­
cal fragmentation (defined in terms of the pattern of parliamentary seat ratios) 
can be very high (as in Finland, or Italy). Classical arguments against PR 
relate the electoral system to fragmentation and so to unstable government. 
The oddity of this argument is that parliamentary coalitions in a number of 
European countries are very often based on a center party, generally called a 
Christian Democrat party (see Laver and Schofield, 1990; Schofield 1994b). 




























































































nance of the centrist Christian Democrat Party (DCI) was destroyed in 1992. 
The results of the recent (May 1994) election in the Netherlands have lead to 
the loss of power of the CDA and a new “purple” coalition involving Labor, 
Liberals and Democrats' 66.
In contrast to the centrist systems of Belgium, Italy (up to 1992) and the 
Netherlands (up to 1994), strong left wing parties in the Scandinavian coun­
tries have often resulted in minority socialist governments, alternating with 
right wing or bourgeois coalition governments. Empirical analyses of party 
declarations and government policy making (Budge et al. 1986; Laver and 
Budge 1993) suggest that the policy space in these countries involves at least 
two dimensions—one economic and one concerning social welfare. The models 
of coalition government that have been proposed give theoretical reasons why 
centrist policies associated with a social consensus should result. It is entirely 
possible that these inferences are dependent on a particular historical context 
that is fading. For example, the reunification of Germany has lead to the for­
mation of new parties (Republicans) and the weakening of the centrist Free 
Democrats. The existence of social consensus in the new Germany may be a 
thing of the past.
However, it is plausible that the overall centrist consensus in the Euroepan 
polities (other than Britain) lies near an electoral European “heart”. This may 
suggest a reason why the current British government finds this European con­
sensus so difficult: as I have suggested the electoral system in Britain does not 
appear to induce centrist government policies.
Japan
Japan has a rather unusual political system, presumably rooted in the nature of 
the electoral system. In the past, multi-seat districts gave rise to intense com­
petition between factions within the Liberal Democratic Party (Schofield and 
Wada, 1994). LDP factions jockeyed for power and contributions but still 
maintained the pretense of a unified party. This “stability” has recently col­
lapsed, as small LDP factions allied themselves with the non-LDP parties. 
Recently of course the anti-LDP coalition broke down as the Socialists in turn 
changed their allegiance. If in fact the Japanese polity is fundamentally zero- 



























































































The Economic Irrationality of the Polity
In this section we review the general argument that political intervention in 
the economic market gives rise to economic irrationalities. To give the argu­
ment in its most blunt and abstract form, suppose that Xi is the economic 
equilibrium outcome which we can assume to be Pareto optimal with regard to 
private goods distribution. It is well known that the private goods economy is 
unable to deal with public goods provision, so assume first that the public 
goods allocation yj is zero. A government is formed and levies some tax, say, 
to create an “optimal” level of public good, y2 (we return to the method of 
public good provision in a moment). By definition taxation effects the private 
good economy, so the outcome is now (x2, y2). We can assume that (x2, y2) is 
unanimously preferred to (xi, 0). Once government is in place, it gives entry 
to interest groups who “manipulate” the economy to secure rents, etc. The 
manipulated outcome, (x3, y3), is preferred to (x2, y2) only by these interest 
groups. The alleged irrationality results because economic productivity is 
higher at (x2, y2) than at (x3, y3). By definiton this means that GNP, say, is 
higher at (x2, y2), so there is a system of transfers within the economy from 
the economically efficient state (x2, v2) to a state (x4, y4) that is preferred by 
almost everyone to (x3, y3). Diagram 2 gives the logic of this argument.
Diagram 2
(xi .O)  ---------
(no government)









Note that it is assumed that once the move to the economically inefficient 
outcome (x3, y3) has been made, it is politically impossible to move to (x4, y4). 
The reason for this is that the interest group prefers (x3, y3) to (x4, y4) and 




























































































The Rise and Decline o f Britain
Olson’s (1982a,b,c) arguments in the Rise and Decline o f Nations can be 
interpreted in terms of this diagram. The interaction of interest groups is 
essentially a prisoner's dilemma: a group, such as a trade union, will defend its 
interests by pushing for higher wage rates, restricting the implementation of 
new technology to maintain employment for its members, or protecting 
against foreign imports. While such a strategy is rational for the group, it is 
socially irrational as it reduces social output in the long run. Once one group 
manipulates in this way, others follow suit, and total output declines further. 
Olson further suggests that the periods of long political stability facilitiate 
interest group activity of this kind, while countries (such as Germany) that 
have had severe social crises, such as defeat in war, have weaker interest 
groups and are less susceptible to this dilemma of democracy. It should be 
remembered that Olson was writing at the end of the 1970's with the aim per­
haps of explaining the relative decline of Britain and the U.S.A. While the 
framework lacked a specific model of interest group behavior, it did perhaps 
appear consistent with the events under the Heath and Callaghan governments 
in Britain. Beer (1982) provided a related model of the “new group politics” 
in Britain. With the decline of party identification, small groups in the econ­
omy became unconstrained in pressing their claims in the political arena for 
subsidies, excess pay rewards and other benefits. Although Beer does not em­
phasize this point, it is possible that the FPP system in Britain had the effect of 
magnifying the power of such interest groups. However it is also fairly obvi­
ous that the trade union groups that Olson had in mind in Britain have been 
more or less emasculated in the last fifteen years. Clearly neither Olson nor 
Beer had a formal model of political activity in mind, and their arguments 
tend to some extent to be contradicted by the models involving political equi­
librium discussed earlier.
Public Goods in the U.S.A.
A somewhat related literature has developed over the last few decades on the 
provision and distribution of public goods. In the classical public finance lit­
erature, the public good is financed by a tax-rate which is chosen by majority 
rule. Since the choice of a tax schedule is a uni-dimensional problem, standard 
Downsian arguments (Denzau and Parks, 1983) would suggest the existence of 
a median tax equilibrium for the political economy. It is evident however that 
evaluation of a given tax rate is dependent on the subsequent choice of what 
public goods are to be created. Moreover any public project is likely to have 
geographically local effects on employment and factor prices. Thus any public 
good decision, and more generally any major government spending decision, 
has some distributional consequences. In a sense Thurow (1980) is correct to 
refer to the “zero sum society”. Various authors have argued that political 
mechanisms, designed to deal with public goods conflicts, will lead to over­




























































































projects that benefit their own constituencies, knowing that most of the cost 
will be faced by other voters. Weingast (1979) for example has argued that 
“universalistic” coalitions including nearly all legislators are likely and that 
these will continuously overprovide public goods. Since the tax costs of this 
overprovision will be high one might expect increasing budget deficits (we 
return to this point in a moment). Although certain aspects of this argument 
may be justified, some difficulties should be mentioned. I assume that the 
nature of preferences by U.S. representatives is quite heterogeneous, but that 
the policy problem is not completely distributional. In this case theory suggests 
that vote trading in Congress will result in a small domain of possible legisla­
tion. By definition this means the coalition is not universalistic. However it is 
true that evaluation of policy outcomes may not involve a complete economic 
pricing. Thus political outcomes may lead to budget deficits, but not necessar­
ily as high as implied by the universalistic model. However it is also true that 
past compromises in the “congressional heart” have resulted in mandated 
transfers that are difficult to change. On the other hand, transformations in 
government expenditures that do not affect large numbers of people are politi­
cally feasible (the recent reductions in military expenditure resulting from the 
end of the cold war are good examples).
Now consider the ability of interest groups to manipulate the U.S. economy. 
In the political choice of economic strategy it would appear appropriate to use 
the results of Condorcet belief aggregation. Because of the heterogeneity of 
the representatives it is reasonable to infer that the consequence of voting on 
issues that are fundamentally uncertain will result in “centrist” policies. For 
example, there is, in the U.S., great variety in popular opinions over the 
virtues of free trade (Nafta in particular) and the appropriate way to deal with 
crime. The content of the trade and crime bills do not suggest that they were 
captured by special interests. Beliefs about the appropriate pattern for health 
care in the U.S. are even more complex. However it is possible that a Con­
dorcet compromise will eventually be found.
The argument just outlined is that heterogeneous beliefs in Congress gener­
ate a “Condorcet” belief equilibrium that need not be identified with any par­
ticular party. This equilibrium will change over time as new information 
becomes available to voters and representatives. It is fairly apparent that the 
U.S. has responded quite vigorously to the structural transformation that is 
affecting the world economy. In general, low productivity jobs are being 
eliminated; the automobile industry which was regarded as incompetent a 
decade ago has responded vigorously to foreign competition; protection 
against imports is fairly weak. All of this is quite contrary to the Olson thesis 
concerning the ability of interest groups to protect themselves. This does not 
mean there is consensus, in the generally accepted meaning of the word, but 
there does appear to be a belief equilibrium. Perhaps unfortunately, one aspect 
of this “equilibrium” is that the tax base of many U.S. cities has been depleted, 




























































































Social Compromise in PR polities
Many authors (Lehmbruch, 1980; Lipjhart, 1976, etc.) have used the term 
consociationalism to describe a situation where bargaining and compromise 
dominate in the political arena. In particular, coalition governments in PR 
polities are based on negotiation between a number of relatively small parties. 
To relate these ideas to the inferences on multiparty PR systems in Europe, it 
is plausible that social consensus is attained through the presence of a relatively 
large “centrist” party which is able, in general, to maintain itself in govern­
ment by bargaining with smaller allied parties. Crouch's (1982) work on eval­
uating the success that the European countries had in moderating inflation and 
unemployment in the 1970’s suggests that high political fragmentation in 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark and Finland made consensus difficult to 
attain. So we can infer there is a conflict between centralism and fragmenta­
tion. What I wish to suggest is that the nature of the social consensus in the 
European polities is based on preference aggregation, and focussed in general 
on a dominant center party. Usually this consensus involves agreement in the 
polity over the nature of the social contract: that is the level of government 
expenditure, minimum wage legislation, health and unemployment benefits, 
access to education, etc. One aspect of the social contract that is relevant is, of 
course, the level of trade protection implied by the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The quite pronounced differences between the general understanding 
of the social contract in the PR parties of the European Union and the nature 
of the belief equilibrium in the U.S. suggests one way of interpreting the dis­
agreements over agriculture that attended the recent GATT negotiatons. Since 
the European Center parties are committed to the social consensus, it has 
proved very difficult for them to adapt to recent structural changes in the 
international economy. Economic protection and the relatively high social cost 
of labor has lead to exceptionally high levels of unempoloyment. Recent 
unemployment figures (Economist, August 1994) are 24.6% (Spain), 14.1% 
(Belgium), 12.6% (France), 12.4% (Denmark), 11.6% (Italy), 9.4% (Britain), 
8.3% (Germany), 7.2% (Netherlands). Meanwhile the U.S. rate is 6.1%. Of 
course these countries are at different stages of the business cycle. However it 
does seem to be the case that one of the consequences of the technological 
transformation that faces us all is a rapid rise in white collar unemployment. If 
this is a permanent feature, then the European centrist social consensus will be 
difficult to maintain. This may be the reason why small extreme parties have 




























































































In the last two sections I have written as though equilibrium necessarily 
exists in the various polities that were discusssed. The instability results from 
the Arrow program suggest, on the contrary, that chaos is a real possibility, 
but only when the underlying dimension of the policy space becomes suffi­
ciently high. In other words in times of economic downturn the political game 
may more closely approximate a zero-sum situation. In the context of the U.S. 
Congress this would imply that the heart explodes out to the full Pareto set. In 
European multiparty polities, the center party would no longer be able to 
control, indirectly, the path of policy making. Instead one would expect con­
stantly changing coalition government. In Britain the implicit electoral coali­
tions underlying the majority party would become unstable. It is possible that 
political representatives in developed democracies take care to prevent, if they 
can, the occurrence of such zero-sum chaos. Of course the international eco­
nomic tribulations and the oil crises of the late 1960's and 1970's did induce 
some degree of chaos. The 1980‘s and early 1990's on the contrary, were a 
period of economic and political recovery from this instability. It is possible 
that attempts to mitigate the effects of the current economic transformation 
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